First published in 1962, contains the William James Lectures delivered at Harvard University in 1955. It sets out Austin's conclusions in the field to which he directed his main efforts for at least the last ten years of his life. Starting from an exhaustive examination of his already well- known distinction of performative utterances from statements, Austin here finally abandons that distinction, replacing it by a more general theory of 'illocutionary forces' of utterances which has important bearings on a wide (...) variety of philosophical problems. (shrink)

Austin takes on the problem of other minds, of how to respond to the question ‘how do you know?’, if this question is raised with regard to the thoughts, feelings, sensations, minds of other creatures. This problem has traditionally been understood as the problem of justifying our belief in the existence of other minds. Austin argues that believing in other persons, in authority and testimony, is an essential part of the act of communicating, and as such is an irreducible part (...) of our experience. While we can state certain advantages of communicative performances, there is no justification for our doing them as such. (shrink)

Austin attacks the view that language is referential, based on the simplistic division of utterances into the ‘descriptive’ and ‘evaluative’, using his notion of performative utterances. Such utterances, in the appropriate circumstances, are neither descriptive nor evaluative, but count as actions, i.e., create the situation rather than describing or reporting on it. In saying ‘I promise to go’ one is making a promise, not stating that one is making it. A performative promise is not, and does not involve, the statement (...) that one is promising. It is an act of a distinctive sort, the very sort named by the performative verb. And, according to Austin, making explicit what one is doing is not describing what one is doing or stating that one is doing it. (shrink)

Criticises G. E. Moore’s highly influential proposal that ascriptions of agent ability implying freedom of choice or action, what the agent could do, are analyzable as conditional statements regarding what the agent would do under certain circumstances. Austin objects against Moore that some uses of ‘if’ are non-conditional and goes on to examine the uses of these non-conditional cases. Moore’s proposal also lies at the heart of some compatibilist theories of free will and determinism. Austin argues determinism to be a (...) pseudo-problem, so long as it remains a notion that is not itself clear cut. (shrink)

Austin discusses the existence, origin, and resemblance of concepts, primarily by discussing the meaning of ‘concept’ and ‘universal’. He argues that, although sometimes it may not be harmful to talk about concepts, we neither understand the meaning of ‘concept’, nor the meaning of ‘acquiring and possessing concepts’, nor a view of concept resemblance as non-sensuous acquaintance or awareness, challenging philosophers who couch their theories in such terms to illuminating them first.

‘Agathon and Eudaimonia in the Ethics of Aristotle’ is a response to an article on the meaning of Agathon in the Ethics of Aristotle, published by H. A. Pritchard in 1935. In this paper, Pritchard argued that Aristotle regarded Agathon to mean ‘conducive to our happiness’ and, consequently, that he maintained that every deliberate action stems, ultimately, from the desire to become happy. Austin finds fault with this view: first, Agathon in Aristotle does not have a single meaning, and a (...) fortiori not the one Pritchard suggested; secondly, if one had to summarise the meaning of ‘being agathon’ in one phrase, then ‘being desired’ cannot fulfil this function, for there are other objects of desire besides τό άγαθόν. (shrink)

Addresses Bedford’s attack on appeals to introspection in the identification of emotions, which lead him to raise the question of how to draw the line between genuine and pretended anger. Austin demonstrates, through a close examination of the speech acts of ‘pretending’ and ‘really being’, that none of the supposed conditional relations between these two notions actually holds. The essay further introduces Austin’s distinction between ‘pretending to do’ and ‘pretending to be’ and emphasises the complex and diverse forms speech acts (...) involving ‘pretending’ can take. (shrink)

Picks up on a previous discussion of responsibility, freedom, and excuses, in which Austin argues that, in order to discover whether someone acted freely, we must discover whether certain excuses relevant to the situation at hand are acceptable. The notion of freedom, according to this view, is intractably linked to the notion of responsibility. Chapter 12 refines the previous discussion, by illuminating the differences between the notions of purpose, intention, and deliberation in a variety of speech acts.

‘Unfair to Facts’ is a follow-up on Ch. 5, addressing objections Peter Strawson raised against Austin’s view of truth as a description of the conditions that must be satisfied if we are to say of a statement that it is true. Austin addresses the objection that his description of these conditions is due to a misunderstanding about the use of ‘fact’, arguing, against Strawson, that facts are not pseudo-entities and that the notion of ‘fitting the facts’ is not a useless (...) notion. (shrink)

McCoy and colleagues (2023) offer a reflective framework for data ethics and governance with several historical bioethics principles as a foundation. Their framework is one among a plethora of othe...

On the meta-level, ‘A Plea for Excuses’, sometimes regarded as the manifesto of ordinary language philosophy, illustrates Austin’s method of approaching philosophical issues, by patiently analysing the subtleties of ordinary language, by example. On the object level, the key distinction with regard to human actions that appear to be worthy of blame, Austin holds to be between a justification, which denies that the performed action was wrong, and an excuse, which instead denies that the agent was responsible for performing it. (...) Austin gives careful attention to particular cases of exculpatory speech, including precise word order and varying emphasis, etymological studies, and the special function of adverbial qualifying phrases, and shows how legal precedents and abnormal psychology may also be helpful in understanding why some efforts to excuse fail. In the final analysis, excuses are properly seen as setting limits to the ascription of moral responsibility, by stating explicitly how they differ from the more usual cases. (shrink)

Business Ethics: A European Review, EarlyView.

Adaptive immunity is unique to the vertebrates, and the molecules involved (including immunoglobulins, T cell receptors and the major histocompatibility complex molecules) seem to have diversified very rapidly early in vertebrate history. Reconstruction of gene phylogenies has yielded insights into the evolutionary origin of a number of molecular systems, including the complement system and the major histocompatibility complex (MHC). These analyses have indicated that the C5 component of complement arose by gene duplication prior to the divergence of C3 and C4, (...) which suggests that the alternative complement pathway was the first to evolve. In the case of the MHC, phylogenetic analysis supports the hypothesis that MHC class II molecules evolved before class I molecules. The fact that the MHC‐linked proteasome components that specifically produce peptides for presentation by class I MHC appear to have originated before the separation of jawed and jawless vertebrates suggests that the MHC itself may have been present at this time. Immmune system gene families have evolved by gene duplication, interlocus recombination and (in some cases) positive Darwinian selection favoring diversity at the amino acid level. (shrink)

_The Foundations of Arithmetic_ is undoubtedly the best introduction to Frege's thought; it is here that Frege expounds the central notions of his philosophy, subjecting the views of his predecessors and contemporaries to devastating analysis. The book represents the first philosophically sound discussion of the concept of number in Western civilization. It profoundly influenced developments in the philosophy of mathematics and in general ontology.

Deals with the question of whether there is a use of ‘is true’ that is the primary or generic name for that which at bottom we are always saying ‘is true’. Austin discusses the views that truth is primarily a property of beliefs and of true statements. He goes on to argue that the word ‘true’ denotes the validity of an intended correspondence between a representation and what it represents, and dismantles confusions about the meaning of the words that underlie (...) such a view, such as ‘fact that’ and ‘corresponds’. (shrink)

Medical discourse in the contemporary United States is rife with military metaphors. These metaphors have come under vigorous criticism over the last few decades but to no avail; the militaristic tendency has proven tenacious. This essay suggests that its tenacity stems, at least in part, from a dualistic understanding of medicine unaddressed by prior criticisms. For an alternative, this essay turns to Augustine of Hippo, balancing close readings of works that deal explicitly with medical themes—The Catholic Way of Life and (...) the Manichean Way of Life (De moribus) and The Nature of the Good (De natura boni)—with a constructive approach. By adapting Augustine's privative account of evil, we can understand disease as a condition of loss and treatment as a task of restoration. This reconfiguration shifts the focus of our interpretive discourses from malicious invaders to a fuller affirmation of the lived experiences of those who are ill. (shrink)